In this paper we introduce simple coalitional pro…les to avoid group deviations in repeated games. In the repeated Cournot supergame we prove that it is possible to sustain the symmetric monopoly outcome by means of a variety of strategies which satisfy the requirement that no coalition (other than the grand coalition) will deviate in any subgame.
Introduction
Most of the equilibrium concepts in the literature of in…nitely repeated games may su¤er from a serious drawback: they do not consider the possibility of a group of players forming a coalition to deviate. Subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are de…ned to avoid single player deviations. Deviations of two or more players are often ignored. In a ground-breaking paper, Horniacek (1996) argues that group deviations should not be ignored, and that any deviation of any coalition (other than the grand one) must be punished by the complementary coalition. Interested readers are referred to Horniacek's paper (1996, pp. 101-102) .
In order to punish coalitional deviations we introduce simple coalitional strategy pro…les which generalize the simple strategy pro…les de…ned by Abreu (1989) . A simple coalitional strategy pro…le consists of one cooperative path and one punishment path for each coalition other than the grand one. These strategies are de…ned as follows: Start the cooperative path and remain on it if no player deviates. If, a coalition deviates after any history, then start the punishment phase of that coalition. Only deviations of all players are ignored.
The equilibrium concept used throughout the paper is the Quasi Strong Perfect Equilibrium (QSPE) introduced by Horniacek (1996) . An equilibrium is QSPE if no coalition can, taking the actions of its complement as given, deviate in a way that bene…ts all of its members. It is explained in Section 3 why the Strong Perfect Equilibrium of Rubinstein (1980) cannot be used.
Next we outline why the problem of checking whether a simple coalitional strategy pro…le is QSPE can be so complex especially when the number of players n is big. To avoid coalitional deviations we need to punish all coalitions except the grand one. Even in the simplest case of a single punishment for each coalition (irrespective of the phase in which the deviation has taken place) deviations of any of the 2 n 2 coalitions from any of the 2 n 1 outcome paths must be avoided. Each coalition could deviate for only one period, for any …nite number of periods, or even forever. Furthermore, coordinated deviations (which are explained in detail in Section 3) must be taken into account. As will be shown, these coordinated deviations could potentially be in…nitely complex.
A relevant contribution of this paper is to simplify this problem substantially. In Section 3 we generalize a result similar to that of Abreu in (1989) . We prove that only one-shot deviations need to be checked to avoid coalitional deviations, where a one-shot deviation is a single-period deviation followed by sticking to the strategy in subsequent periods.
To obtain all the major results of this paper we need to introduce an auxiliary equilibrium concept which is even stronger than QSPE, and which we call the Quasi Even Stronger Perfect Equilibrium (QESPE). An equilibrium is QESPE if no coalition other than the grand one, taking the actions of its complement as given, can deviate in a way that increases the sum of the payo¤s of all of its members. Note that if a strategy is QESPE then it is also QSPE, whereas the reverse is not true.
One of the contributions of this paper is to show that in the Cournot supergame with any number of players it is possible to sustain the symmetric monopoly outcome by means of a variety of strategies which satisfy the requirement that no coalition other than the grand one may deviate in any subgame (provided that the discount factor is close enough to 1). A straightforward conclusion from this result is that, at least in the symmetric Cournot model, any coalition which has the possibility of improving the payo¤s of all of its members with a deviation, also has di¤erent strategies for sustaining that deviation in a credible way (where credibility means that no subcoalition will deviate further). This enables us to conclude that any deviation of any coalition must be punished by the complementary coalition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the preliminaries. Section 3 and 4 present the results. Section 5 concludes with some comments on related work, with special attention to Horniacek (1996) . Appendix is divided into two parts, one with the lemmas used in the paper and their proofs and the other with the proofs of the results.
Preliminaries
Let G = (Q 1 ; :::; Q n ; 1 ; :::; n ) be an n-player game where N = f1; :::; ng is the set of players, Q i is the set of actions q i of player i and i : Q = Q 1 ::: Q n ! R is player i's payo¤ function.
The associated in…nitely repeated game with discounting is denoted by G 1 ( ) where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. If q (t) = (q 1 (t) ; :::; q n (t)) is the vector of actions played in period t, then fq (1) ; :::; q (t)g is a history h of length t. A strategy i of player i in G 1 ( ) is a sequence of functions t i
(or i (t)) from the set of all histories of length t 1 to Q i , so 1 i 2 Q i is the initial action of player i. A stream of action pro…les fq (t)g 1 t=1 is referred to as an outcome path and is denoted by S. A strategy pro…le = ( i ) i2N generates an outcome path S ( ) = fq ( ) (t)g 1 t=1 de…ned inductively by:
The value i (q (t)) denotes the payo¤ of player i in period t when the outcome in this period is q (t). And i (S) denotes the discounted payo¤ of player i for the outcome path S = fq (t)g 1 t=1 :
Then, the discounted payo¤ of player i in G 1 ( ) obtained with the strategy
In this paper, we consider the Cournot Supergame with perfect monitoring. So the preliminaries for this model are also introduced here.
Take n …rms producing a homogeneous product at a constant marginal cost c > 0. The industry inverse demand function is denoted by p (z) and the payo¤s are i (q 1 ; :::; q n ) = (p (q 1 + ::: + q n ) c) q i , where q i is the output of …rm i.
Some reasonable assumptions about this game are:
Assumption A 1 . p : R + ! R + is continuous, di¤erentiable and with p 0 (z) < 0 for all z > 0 such that p (z) > 0, lim z!1 p (z) = 0, and p (0) > c.
We introduce a capacity constraint in Q i in order to make this set compact. Formally, Q i = 0; Note that this capacity constraint _ q( ) is not at all restrictive, since the loss to a …rm from producing an output greater than _ q( ) cannot be recouped by any possible future gain (Abreu, 1986) . Let q i (q i ) be a single period best response to q i = (q 1 ; :::; q i 1 ; q i+1 ; :::; q n ), i.e., q i (q i ) satis…es i (q 1 ; :::; q i (q i ); :::; q n ) i (q 1 ; :::; q i ; :::; q n ) for all q i 2 Q i . Set i (q 1 ; :::; q n ) = i (q i (q i ); q i ).
is well de…ned, unique, and q (z) = q 1 (q 2 ; :::; q n ), where z = q 2 + ::: + q n , is a continuous, non-increasing function.
Let nq m be the monopoly output level, i.e., q m is such that 1 (nq m ; 0; :::; 0) 1 (q; 0; :::; 0) for all q 2 Q 1 .
Assumption A 3 . q m is unique, strictly positive and 1 (q; :::; q) declines strictly monotonically as output increases beyond q m or falls below q m .
Assumptions A 1 ; A 2 and A 3 are equivalent to the assumptions made by Segerstrom (1988) and Abreu (1986) . Segerstrom (1988) proved in his Lemma 1, that the game with two players has exactly one Cournot Nash equilibrium which is symmetric. For a game with n players the generalization of this result is immediate.
We denote this unique Cournot Nash equilibrium by (q c ; :::; q c ) and its payo¤ by c = i (q c ; :::; q c ). Also (q m ; :::; q m ) and m = i (q m ; :::; q m ).
For the sake of simplicity, we use q c instead of (q c ; :::; q c ) and q m instead of (q m ; :::; q m ) whenever it is clear from the context which is which.
is the unique total quantity satisfying p( 
Quasi Even Stronger Perfect Equilibrium
Simple strategy pro…les are de…ned to avoid single player deviations (Abreu (1988) ). Deviations of two or more players are always ignored. As argued in the Introduction, group deviations cannot be ignored, and any deviation by a coalition (other than the grand one) must be punished by the complementary coalition. Now, to prevent group deviations, we introduce simple coalitional strategy pro…les.
A simple coalitional strategy pro…le is determined by 2 n 1 outcome paths (one cooperative path associated with ; and one punishment path for each coalition other than the grand one). These outcome paths are denoted by S I where
for I N , which inductively de…ne the following strategy pro…le: (i) Play S ; until a coalition deviates singly from S ; .
( In other words, start cooperating and continue cooperating if no player deviates. If after any history a coalition deviates, start the punishment phase of that coalition. Only deviations of all players are ignored. Rubinstein (1980) introduced the concept of Strong Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) in repeated games. SPE requires that no coalition can improve the payo¤ of all of its members after any history. In view of the arguments above this is not a very strong solution concept. However in repeated games there is often no SPE. For instance Farrell (2001) proves that in the Cournot model with linear demand there is no SPE whenever n > 3: This is because there is no way to punish the grand one. Thus, to avoid joint deviation by all the players one is restricted to using Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤s in all the punishment phases. In most cases it is not possible to deter deviations while maintaining Pareto e¢ ciency.
So the problem of the existence of SPE is basically concerned with the grand one. This motivates the introduction of a slight modi…cation of the concept of SPE.
A simple coalitional strategy pro…le is a Quasi-Strong Perfect Equilibrium (QSPE) (Horniacek (1996) ) if there is no coalition D N and no strategy 0 D such that for some history h:
If an equilibrium is a QSPE, then the vector of payo¤s ( 1 ( ) ; :::; n ( )) can also be said to be a QSPE.
QSPE guarantees that no coalition (other than the grand one) will deviate in any subgame. The possibility of a deviation by the grand one is discussed below in the Conclusions.
Now it needs to be explained why it is so complex to check whether a simple coalitional strategy pro…le is QSPE (especially when n is big). Note that deviations by any of the 2 n 2 coalitions from any of the 2 n 1 outcome paths need to be prevented. Each coalition could also deviate for only one period, for any …nite number of periods or for ever. Furthermore, coordinated deviations 2 need to be taken into account, which could seriously complicate this problem. The meaning of coordinated deviations here is illustrated with the following example.
Example Consider the Cournot supergame with …ve players, a linear demand function given by p = 100 z ( if z < 100 and 0 otherwise) and a linear cost function with marginal cost c = 20. Let be the simple coalitional strategy pro…le de…ned by: S ; = f(10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g S f1g = f(0; 50; 0; 0) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g. S f2g = f(50; 0; 0; 0) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g. S f3g = f(0; 0; 0; 50) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g. S f4g = f(0; 0; 50; 0) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g. S f1;2g = f(0; 0; 25; 25) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g and for fi; jg 6 = f1; 2g, S fi;jg is identical to S f1;2g except that the roles of players 1 and 2, and players i and j are interchanged. S f1;2;3g = f(0; 0; 0; 50) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; (10; 10; 10; 10) ; :::g and for fi; j; kg 6 = f1; 2; 3g, S fi;j;kg is identical to S f1;2;3g except that the roles of players 1, 2 and 3, and players i, j and k are interchanged.
In this example it can be shown by simple but rather long computations, that if > 0:5625 no coalition D N can obtain more bene…ts for all of its members with joint deviations of . However, players 1 and 2 can obtain more bene…ts by coordinating their deviations according to the following plan: First player 2 deviates singly from S f1g . In the next period recommends that S f2g be started. Instead, player 1 deviates from S f2g , while player 2 follows . Then recommends that S f1g be started again. But then again player 2 deviates singly from S f1g , and in the next period player 1 deviates from S f2g , and so on. Note that m = 1 (10; 10; 10; 10) = 2 (10; 10; 10; 10) = 400, So both players …nd it more pro…table to follow the above plan of alternating deviations than to continue with . The conclusion is that although coalition f1; 2g is not able to obtain more bene…ts for all of its members with a joint deviation from (after any history), players 1 and 2 are able to improve their payo¤s by coordinating their actions.
In general a coordinated deviation by a coalition D alternates deviations by subcoalitions B D according to a plan which could, potentially, be in…nitely complex. This seriously complicates the problem of checking that no coalition D N will ever deviate. In order to deal with this problem a new equilibrium concept which is even stronger than SPE needs to be introduced.
De…nition A simple coalitional strategy pro…le is a Quasi-Even Stronger Perfect Equilibrium (QESPE ) if there is no coalition D N and no strategy 0 D such that for some history h:
If an equilibrium is a QESPE, then the vector of payo¤s ( 1 ( ) ; :::; n ( )) can also be said to be a QESPE.
QESPE is just an intermediate concept. We do not claim that it is interesting in itself. We use it to prove the existence of QSPE. Note that if is QESPE then is also SPE, whereas the reverse is not true.
This new concept allows us to obtain a result that signi…cantly simpli…es the process of checking that no coalition will ever deviate. Abreu (1988) proves that simple strategy pro…les are simple not only because of their de…n-ition but also because it is easy to check whether they are subgame perfect equilibria. According to his Proposition 1 (p. 391), only one-shot deviations need be checked to ensure subgame perfection, where a one-shot deviation from a strategy consists of a single period deviation followed by sticking to the strategy afterwards. The proposition below generalizes this …nding by Abreu to the QESPE concept. This condition means that no coalition can in sum obtain more payo¤s with a single period joint deviation followed by sticking to the strategy thereafter. Nor are one-shot coordinated deviations pro…table in sum for any subcoalition B D.
QESPE in the Cournot Supergame
Proposition in Horniacek (1996) establishes a su¢ cient condition for an action vector to be sustained by a QSPE (for a discount factor close enough to 1). From this condition it is straightforward to prove the existence of QSPE in the Cournot model. However this result does not guarantee the Pareto optimality of the payo¤s.
In this section we prove that, under assumptions A1-A3, the symmetric monopoly outcome can be sustained as a QSPE even when the number of players tends to in…nity.
Next we given su¢ cient conditions to sustain the symmetric monopoly outcome as a QESPE. The number of periods in the punishment phase of coalitions I with more than one player may have to be increased, and some margin will probably also be lost in the discount factor, but anyway the existence of QESPE (and therefore of QSPE) is guaranteed for close enough to 1 Let be a two-phase simple strategy pro…le such that S ; = fq m g Corollary If the symmetric monopoly outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium with a two-phase simple strategy pro…le satisfying 2 (q p ) m , then there is a simple, two-phase coalitional strategy pro…le that also sustains the symmetric monopoly outcome as a QESPE (and therefore as a QSPE).. Now it is straightforward to prove the central theorem of this paper.
Theorem The symmetric monopoly outcome can be sustained as a QESPE (and therefore as a QSPE) for any number of players provided that the discount factor is close enough to 1.
The simple coalitional strategy pro…le strategy considered in the proof of this theorem is de…ned by S ; = fq m g The next step is to show that there is a variety of QESPE strategies for which the symmetric monopoly outcome can be sustained, and that some of these strategies may have a very di¤erent structure. To show this we include two di¤erent types of QESPE strategy: To see that is QESPE it su¢ ces to check that conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 are satis…ed. As 1 (q p ) = 2 (q p ) < 0 and 1 (q p ) = 0 the result follows. Therefore all these strategies sustain ( m ; :::; m ) as a QESPE for close enough to 1. Note that strategies of this kind have a stick and carrot structure and are similar to the strategies proposed by Abreu (1986) . However two di¤erences should be pointed out: the …rst is that t periods of punishment may be needed instead of only one. The second is that in the carrot phase of the punishment we always come back to q m whereas Abreu, looking for the most severe punishment, returns in most cases to a level with less pro…ts than m .
Now we propose a new type of strategy that also sustains the monopoly outcome as an QESPE. The idea is to force the cheater to accept the punishment, thus ensuring that this player in question will not deviate during his punishment phase. . Thus R(q) q and 1 (R(q); q; :::; q) 2 (R(q); q; :::; q) m , hence condition (i) follows.
Moreover, as (z) is decreasing on [0;
_ z] we have 1 (R(q); q; :::; q) = ((n 1)q) ((n 1)q c ) = c < m . Hence (ii) holds.
In the linear Cournot model, it can be easily shown that 2 (R(q); q; :::; q) m for all q 2
, so we conclude that is QESPE for all q 2
.
Conclusions
In this paper we show that, in repeated games, coalitional deviations may have to be punished. Otherwise coalitions could sustain their deviations with QSPE strategies (i.e., strategies that meet the condition that no subcoalition deviates further). In this setting, the subgame perfect equilibrium is therefore a weak equilibrium concept. This conclusion is not new. It was reached by Horniacek with a di¤erent, original argument.
One question that remains outstanding is this: what about deviations by the grand one?
To prevent deviations by the grand one one would have to choose the optimal strategy among all the QSPE strategies according to a criterion. Using a common expression in game theory, it can be said that a QSPE strategy is a strategy with internal stability. In these terms external stability means that there is no other strategy which is QSPE and is preferred by all players. As shown above, in the Cournot model, there are in…nite strategies that are QSPE. However, due to the complexity of the problem, it is not vet possible to characterize all QSPE strategies. We are only able to present results concerning existence. That is why, this paper, does not attempt to establish the external stability condition. Horniacek (1996) seeks to approximate a Strong Perfect Equilibrium in the setting of discounted supergames. He solves the problem of deviations by the grand one by imposing two additional requirements on the QSPE 3 concept. The …rst is that no coalition can increase the average payo¤ of at least one of its members by more than without decreasing the average payo¤ of any other members. The second is to add Weak Renegotiation Proofness in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989) . Horniacek proves necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of this concept. However the strategies used in his proofs are really complex. We believe that the main contribution of our work is to simplify this problem by means of simple coalitional strategy pro…les. We believe it might be of interest to follow Horniacek's approach using our results to advance in his line of investigation.
Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) We must show that is a QESPE if and only if the cooperative path S ; takes the action q m for each period and the punishment path S I takes the action q I , t times, and then q m forever. The following lemma establishes su¢ cient conditions for a strategy of this kind to be QESPE provided that the players are su¢ ciently patient. First we introduce some useful notation. Let D be a coalition of N . Set
Lemma 1 A simple coalitional strategy pro…le with a two-phase punishment is QESPE for a suitable t and close enough to 1 if the following conditions hold: Proof. By Proposition 1 only one-shot deviations need be checked to ensure that is a QESPE. In this case only the following one-shot deviations need be checked: (i) Deviations of coalition D from path S ; . To avoid this we must show that the following inequality hold:
Let F ( ) = P 
Then, taking t >
, by condition (a), we have that
F ( ) < 0 and (2) holds for close enough to 1.
(ii) Deviations by coalition D from S I in the …rst period. Now the inequality to be checked is:
Let
Hence lim
, we have that lim (3) is true for close enough to 1.
Finally it is straightforward that if a deviation from q I in the …rst period of S I is not pro…table then a deviation from q I in periods 2; :::; t is not 
We argue by induction on n. If n = 2 then ((n k)q) = (0) = 2 m 2 and the result follows. For n 2, if k = n we have ((n k)q) = (0) = n m n . Suppose now that k n 1. 
